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ABSTRACT 
The 1980s in the UK was associated with government by one political party and one 
leader dedicated to reducing government spending and taxation. 
This paper analyses the history of public spending and taxation in this period in the 
light of the government’s stated objectives and recognition in the academic literature 
that mixed economies have immense “inertial” features. We examine changes in 
government spending and taxation after 1979, alongside developments in monitoring, 
controlling and evaluating spending. The paper demonstrates that more headway has 
been made in the latter area than in reigning back spending and taxation. The 
paper also considers the source of the single biggest failure in the reform of UK 
public finance in the 198Os, the introduction of the Community Charge. 
The broad conclusion of the paper is that the government scores high on rhetoric but 
much more modestly in terms of results. To date there has been little progress in 
introducing the most obvious test of value for money - the willingness of consumers 
to pay for the service. 
I INTRODUCTION 
The UK experience during the 1980s with regard to taxation and government 
expenditure is of interest for two general reasons. 
First, this period of recent British history provides a decade-plus experience 
unmarked by the “swings and roundabouts” of democratic government. One political 
party (the Conservatives) and one Prime Minister (Mrs Margaret Thatcher) were in 
governmental power through the entire period’. The three successive Conservative 
governments have thus had ample time, and popular support, to enact and to develop 
their major thrusts of policy as regards government spending and taxing, and other 
areas of economic policy’. 
Second, these governments during the Thatcher Decade of the 1980s did have a clear 
and simple political objective regarding government spending and taxing, which can 
be summed up in the phrase “rolling back the state”. Speaking in the mid-1970s - 
the years in which the Conservatives were to establish their “new Right”, new edge in 
political rhetoric and policy prescription, breaking with the mixed economy 
“consensus” of the post-War years - the then Leader of the Opposition said: 
“My first call . . . . is for a defined role for government . . . . the present role and 
expenditure of government has produced unacceptable taxation and a 
horrendous borrowing requirement.” (Thatcher, 1977, p 75) 
Mrs Thatcher has been dubbed as “The Iron Lady”. There is no disagreement 
amongst political commentators, of any persuasion, that she was the most dominant 
and tenacious British Prime Minister of any since Winston Churchill during the War. 
She was also a self-styled “conviction politician”; and her clear conviction upon 
coming to power was that the levels of British government spending and taxation 
needed to be brought down. It is also relevant to note that Mrs Thatcher received 
her training in her pre-political career as a specialist tax lawyer. 
But contemporary, complex systems of government spending and taxing in mixed 
economies have immense “inertial” features (Rose and Karran, 1987). What happens 
when a succession of governments, led by a determined Prime Minister committed to 
cutting government spending and taxation, runs up against the realities of inertness 
to change that characterises these systems? 
This paper examines the answers to that general question with specific regard to the 
UK experience during the Thatcher Decade of the 1980s. Section II provides some 
background to the Thatcher Decade, against which the shape and pace of change 
during those years need to be judged. Section III then examines the main changes 
in UK taxation that ensued during the decade. 
The scope for cutting the general burden of taxation must3, however, ultimately 
depend upon (a) the level of government spending and (b) governmental objectives 
regarding the level of deficit finance. As the. mid-1970s quotation from Mrs 
Thatcher above suggests, a further goal of Conservative economic policy was to be a 
considerable reduction in government borrowing to finance budget deficits - and 
indeed, the public sector borrowing requirement (PSBR)4 was slimmed over the 1980s 
until, by 1987-88, the government started running a budget surplus5. Thus, 
ultimately, the scope for Thatcherite tax cuts depended upon the ability of her 
successive governments to rein in or back the level of government spending. We 
examine the extent to which this was achieved, and how it was done, in Section IV. 
Section V briefly surveys developments in the monitoring, control, and evaluation of 
government expenditure in the UK that occurred during the Thatcher Decade. 
Although these developments achieved little notoriety, compared with the Community 
Charge (Poll Tax), they are of significance from a long-run point of view and indeed 
may well outlast the more ephemeral fiscal developments that received at the time so 
much newspaper headline billing. 
Section VI surveys the very recent British experience with the Community Charge 
introduced in Scotland in 1989 and in England and Wales in 1990. Although 
primarily a tax measure/change we survey this matter separately from other tax 
changes (in Section II) because of its recent (and controversial) introduction, and also 
because it relates only to local taxation, rather than to the main body of UK taxes. 
Moreover, although a tax measure, the rationale of the community charge is in part 
that it is an inherently (local) government-expenditure restraining device. 
Additionally, it undoubtedly led to more furore than all of the other fiscal changes 
during the Thatcher Decade added together. Indeed it may be seen as a salient 
factor in Mrs Thatcher’s increasing troubles within the Conservative Parliamentary 
Party, leading to her stepping down as Leader, and thus the Premiership. 
Section VII offers some conclusions on the experience detailed in the core of the 
paper. 
II SOME BACKCROUNDTOTHETHATCHER DECADE 
During the Nineteenth Century, British government spending as a proportion of 
national income seldom moved far from the “typical” ratio of 10 per cent, except in 
times of war (Buchanan, Burton and Wagner, 1978, Part II). The Twentieth 
Century’s budgetary record in the UK exhibits a generally different pattern. There 
has been a rising ratio of both government spending and taxing, over the long haul 
of the century, punctuated in particular by two considerable upward jumps associated 
with the occurrence of the First and Second World Wars (Peacock and Wiseman, 
1961). 
The causes of this long-run historical transformation in budgetary behaviour, 
including the role of the discontinuities in the record associated with war in the 
Twentieth Century, have been much analysed by economists and political scientists, 
and will not detain us here. Suffice it to say that there is a variety of potential 
explanations, some of which emphasise developments on the demand-side of the 
political market-place, others which concentrate upon the supply-side of that market, 
and yet others which analyse the budgetary record over the long term as the result of 
the interaction of both forces6. It is also fair to say that there is no obvious 
“winner” in this contest of hypotheses; and it is, perhaps, that these aggregate, long- 
run phenomena are of complex origin that elude any simple explanation of the 
record. 
The salient point is that, by the time of the 1950s and 1960s in the UK, the ratio of 
government expenditure to national income had - as in other Western democracies - 
risen to a sizeable fraction. In the UK, for those years, the ratio was of the general 
order of less than 40 per cent, varying according to the predilections of the party in 
power, the circumstances of the year in question and, indeed, the (unknown) errors 
in the computation of this ratio7. 
6 
The 197Os, however, marked a further upward turn in the ratio, a development 
which was described in tense terms by the Treasury at that time: 
“In the last three years public expenditure has grown nearly 20 per cent in 
volume, while (national) output has risen less than two per cent. The ratio 
of public expenditure to gross domestic product at factor cost has risen from 
50 per cent in 1971-2 to about 60 per cent in 1975-6’ (HM Treasury, 1976, 
p.2)8. 
At the same time, by 1975, the PSBR was running at over 10 per cent of GDP at 
factor cost: a figure that dwarfs the contemporary size, and worries, about the 
government budget deficit in the USA (which has been more of the order of 3-4 per 
cent of American GDP). Moreover, by 1976, the British government found 
increasing difficulty in obtaining external loans to cover the deficit on the current 
account of the balance of payments. There was, in short, a budgetary - 
deficit/trade - deficit/government borrowing crisis. The Labour government of the 
time was eventually impelled (in 1976) to apply to the IMF for large loans, under the 
terms of which it accepted constraints upon the size of the PSBR, the growth of 
government spending, and the rate of growth of the money supply9, for a three year 
period. 
(TABLE 1 NEAR HERE) 
This mid-1970s crisis was naturally utilised, and to considerable political effect, by 
Mrs Thatcher - the then recently-elected leader of the Conservative Party and 
Leader of HM Official Opposition - to pillory her Labour government opponents. 
In 1977 also, the Conservatives published a major economic policy document, The 
Right Approach to the Economy, containing nine -main policy commitments, and 
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jointly authored by the major figures in the Conservative economic policy team. 
Twp of its major pledges, under a Conservative government, were: 
“....Firm management of government expenditure, to reduce the burden on the 
economy and leave more in people’s pockets.” 
‘I... Lower taxation on earnings, capital and savings, to increase the rewards of 
skill and enterprise - paving the way to more jobs . ..I’ (Howe, et al, 1977, 
P.7). 
This policy document also contained the highly specific pledge that it was: 
I’... Our intention to allow State spending and revenue a significantly smaller 
percentage of the nation’s annual output and income each year. The reduction 
will thus be progressive . . . (italics added; Howe et al, 1977, p.10). 
This specific commitment was to be repeated in the run up to the general election, 
and ‘I... in 1979 Margaret Thatcher campaigned on a manifesto declaring that the 
state’s share of the nation’s income “must be steadily reduced” (Rose and Karran, 
1987, p.14). 
It is, however, usually much easier to promise to do things rather than actually to 
undertake them. This is particularly the case in the attempt to “roll back the state” 
in the contemporary era of Big Government presiding over a welfare state. Tax 
laws are not mere pieces of paper, but rather the product or accretion of a morass of 
many changes that have accumulated over many years (often centuries) of evolution. 
Likewise, the programmes of government expenditure and tax expenditures that are 
typical of the modern welfare state (although usually of more recent origin) are 
complex systems in which myriads of (voter-) beneficiaries are involved - and who 
assume that they are so entitled to remain. It is for such reasons that Milton and 
Rose Friedman (1984) have diagnosed that contemporary governments - even if of a 
persuasion to “roll back the state”, and with a popular mandate so to do - would, in 
the absence of a constitutional means of constraining government expenditure, prove 
incapable of doing so, being subject to the sort of inertial equilibrium in politics that 
they describe as “the tyranny of the status quo”. 
Mrs Thatcher has consistently shunned issues of constitutional reform, including, 
specifically, the constitutional disciplining of government spending growth as, for 
example, espoused by the Friedmans (1984, ch 9). Moreover, as a pragmatic matter, 
it is admittedly difficult, even if not totally impossible, to see how the Friedmanite 
prescription for restraining government spending via constitutional devices could in 
fact be put in place in the case of Britain. As the UK has no (or, rather, very 
little) written constitution, it cannot be rewritten by formal amendment, as in 
America. That which passes for the British Constitution is in fact largely nothing 
more than political convention; and the fundamental convention of the British 
Constitution is that no government can bind its successorl’. 
Bereft of the constitutionalist route to the limitation of government spending and 
taxation, Mrs Thatcher had to strive via other means to achieve her objectives of 
budgetary retrenchment and tax burden reduction. How did these fare? The next 
three sections explore the answers. 
III UK TAXATION CHANGES AFTER 1979 
Before proceeding to describe the major tax changes in the UK since 1979, we note 
some general features of the UK tax system as a whole. 
First, Britain’s general structure of taxation, and the relative utilisation of different 
methods of tax exaction upon the populace, is not dissimilar to that of most other 
Western countries. Second, there is a considerable variety of taxes; the UK national 
11 accounts listing them under some 38 separate headings . This complex system has 
evolved over centuries, as the result of a variety of disparate developments and 
amendments, and is lacking in consistency and overall integrity; or - as a standard 
reference text for accountants and tax lawyers describes the UK tax system - perhaps 
‘I... it is better described as a shambles” (Butterworths, 1984, p.11). 
Third, however, the bulk of tax revenues in the UK comes from but a few main 
sources. These are five in number: income taxes; national insurance contributions; 
corporation (profit) tax; value-added tax; and local government taxation. In 1988, 
these five sources accounted together for 82 per cent of ail tax revenues in the UK. 
Income tax was and is the single most important source of revenue, contributing 
around one-quarter of the total. 
The decade of the 1980s thus offered the Conservative governments in successive 
power under Mrs Thatcher two major opportunities: to implement their pledge to 
reduce the burden of taxation in relation to national income in a steady fashion, year 
after year; and, at the same time to eliminate the “shambolic” features of the system. 
Indeed, The Right Approach to the Economy (Howe et al, 1977) had committed the 
Conservatives to precisely these two goals: to reducing the general tax burden and to 
simplifying the tax structure. 
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What, however, was done in reality ? Abstracting from the morass of details in every 
Budget Statement, three major tax reform packages may be identified over the period 
1979 to 1990. 
The first was undertaken in 1979, and put into effect within one month of the 
Conservatives’ election to power. This involved a considerable shift in the burden 
of taxation from direct to indirect sources. The basic rate of income tax was 
reduced from 33 to 30 per cent, whilst allowances were simultaneously increased 
substantially. The loss of revenue, however, was at the same time offset by an 
(almost) doubling of the standard rate of VAT, from 8 to 15 per cent. We note in 
passing that to shuffle the pack is not the same thing as cutting the size of the deck. 
Taxpayers may “feel the pain” of paying indirect taxation less so than with direct 
taxation. Nevertheless, to the extent that this effect operates, it is an illusion, 
arising from the often subsumed character of VAT within prices charged in the 
market. 
Another round of tax reforms was introduced in the first budget of Mrs Thatcher’s 
second term of office. The new Chancellor, Mr Nigel Lawson, unveiled in his first 
(1984) Budget Statement what he styled a “tax reform budget”. The main feature of 
this was a phased reduction of tax relief on business investments (capital allowances) 
in return for a reduction in the rates of Corporation Tax. 
Most commentators would, however, probably be sympathetic to the view that in the 
case of the “reformist” Budget of 1984, Mr Lawson’s rhetoric ‘I... proved to be more 
substantial than the reality” (Dilnot and Kay, 1990, p 154). For example, the 
structure of personal taxation was left alone, apart from the withdrawal of a few so- 
called tax expenditures (eg partial relief for life insurance contributions). 
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In presenting his fifth Budget (and the first of Mrs Thatcher’s third term) on 15 
March 1988, Mr Lawson was again to announce a “radical, reforming” package.12 
So far as the typical income-taxpayer was concerned, this proved to be far more 
accurate than in 1984. The basic rate of income tax was brought down to 25 per 
cent, and the higher rate bands - which previously had stood at 40 to 60 per cent - 
were consolidated into one higher rate of 40 per cent; simultaneously taxable 
allowances were raised by twice as much as the increase in the retail price index. 
Corporation tax on companies with low profits (known misleadingly as the “small 
companies” rate) was also reduced to 25 per cent to reflect the cut in the basic rate 
of income tax and in order to encourage enterprise 13 . Despite all of this 
“radicalism”, however, Mr Lawson forecast in his Statement that the tax burden on 
the economy as a proportion of GDP would stay at the same level (there were, for 
example, some considerable increases in various elements of indirect taxation, also 
announced in the same Budget statement). 
What then, happened overall to taxation in the UK during the Thatcher Decade of 
the 198Os? Presenting the general picture in the most amiable light, there have been 
some considerable, not to say spectacular reductions in rates of taxation over the 
period: from 98 to 40 per cent for the top rate of income tax; from 33 to 25 per 
cent as regards the basic rate (the only rate paid by around 93 per cent of income tax 
paws); from 52 to 35 per cent for corporation tax (and even lower, for “small 
companies”); and from 75 to 40 per cent for inheritance tax. 
Yet, for the broad mass of UK taxpayers, there has been a considerable offset to 
these developments by increases in other rates of taxation; for example, from 8 to 15 
per cent on transactions subject to VAT, and from 6.5 to 9 per cent as regards the 
ordinary rate of national insurance contributions (for all practical purposes national 
insurance contributions can be viewed as a tax in the UK). There was, in short, a 
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considerable amount of “swings and roundabouts” going on amidst all of this 
supposedly radical reform. The major tax changes are summarised in Table II. 
(TABLE II NEAR HERE) 
Indeed, in terms of the central objective for taxation as defined in The Right 
Approach to the Economy, the reform packages from 1979 onwards singly failed to 
achieve their central purpose. As we see from Table I, the tax burden in 1978 - the 
last full year of Labour Government office - stood at 37.37 per cent of UK GDP. 
But the tax burden then actually rose in subsequent years (see Table III), reaching a 
peak of 44.08 per cent of GDP in 1984. Thus, for the first six years of 
“Thatcherism”, the UK tax burden was going in completely the opposite direction to 
that stipulated in The Right Approach: ie to make tax I’... revenue a significantly 
smaller percentage of the nation’s annual output and income in each year” (op tit). 
(TABLE III NEAR HERE) 
It is true that after 1984, as Table III shows, the T/Y ratio for the UK starts to fall, 
by the order of one-quarter a per cent per annum as a fraction of GDP. However, 
even the result of this very belated and modest exercise in tax burden-slimming was 
to leave the T/Y ratio in the UK at (just a sliver under) 43 per cent in 1989. Thus, 
at the end of the 198Os, the tax burden in the UK was higher than for any year in 
the 197Os, with the exception of 1970 - and even way above the levels of that for 
the “fiscal crisis year” of 1976 - by over 4 per cent of UK GDP! 
Taking taxes in general, and in relation to the level of national income, the “Thatcher 
Decade” of the 1980s were years of even-more burdensome taxation than were the 
1970s. If we ignore the changeover year of 1979 - when the incoming Conservative 
government cannot be fully held responsible for the tax situation, due to the inertial 
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features of taxation and the budgetary process - and average experience for the two 
periods of nine years 1970-78 and 1980-88, the distinction stands out. For the first 
period, 1970-78, the UK average annual tax burden, as shown in the first column of 
Table IV, was 39.06 per cent. For the latter period, 1980-88, the corresponding 
figure was 43.57 per cent - more than four and a half percentage points of UK GDP 
higher. 
So much, then, for the Thatcher experiment in rolling back the tax burden of the 
state! For the first half of the 198Os, this particular stone was rolling in the “wrong” 
direction when compared to the announced central objective of policy, and the 
modest subsequent movement in the “right” direction failed to return the UK 
economy to the less burdensome levels of taxation generally experienced throughout 
the years of the 1970s. 
(TABLE IV NEAR HERE) 
Is there any saving grace to the taxation side of Thatcherite budgetary policies 
arising from the much touted reforms of the structural incoherence of the tax 
system? Here, the general picture is disappointing. The changes to the income tax 
structure are largely to be welcomed - for example, the higher-band tax rates of the 
past were widely judged to be penal, and of insignificance in overall revenue 
terms14 - but ‘I... * improvements to the income tax schedule have been more than 
eroded by the increasingly convoluted structure of national insurance contributions, 
which is now a tax of almost equal significance” (Dilnot and Kay, 1990, p 175). 
Moreover, whilst Mr Lawson (1988) announced that the government’s objective was 
11 . . . to see that, as a general rule, people’s choices were distorted as little as reasonably 
possible through the tax system”, it may be argued that the tax regime in 1989 
regarded savings just as incoherently as previously. On the plus side, the 
14 
distortionary effects arising from the interaction of the tax and benefit systems have, 
hopever, been lessened. 
We return to the further issues for discussion and analysis arising from local tax 
matters in Section V, but at this point move on to an examination of the Thatcher 
record on government spending. 
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IV GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE IN THE 1980s IN THE UK 
The Public Expenditure White Paper of 1980, unhesitatingly and clearly reiterated 
the commitment to reining back government expenditure expressed in the pre- 
election Right Approach to the Economy of 1977, and in ringing terms: 
“The government is determined not merely to halt the growth of public 
spending but progressively to reduce it” (HM Treasury, 1980) 
The White Paper then went on to announce a real increase in government 
expenditure for 1979-80, the first year of office! It was not, as we shall see, a 
propitious start towards the announced goal of reducing government expenditure. 
The rising volume of government expenditure for 1979-80 was written off with two 
alibis. First, as the government had been elected only in May, the budgetary 
process was in full swing, and the trajectory of public expenditure, inherited from 
the previous (Labour) government, was difficult to deflect in such a short space of 
time. Second, in the run-up to the election the government had given certain 
pledges that would require an initial rise in government expenditure, notably to 
honour the recommendations of a wide public sector pay inquiry, chaired by 
Professor Hugh Clegg, that involved large increases. 
After this “blip”, cuts in government expenditure as a proportion of national income 
were planned for the remainder of the planning horizon after 1981/82 up to 1983/84 
- amounting eventually to around 2 per cent of GDP. 
Behind this aggregative programme to cut the ratio of government spendtng to 
national income lay divergent plans with regard to the composition of the former. 
These fall into three categories (Smith, 1988, ch 3): programmes which the new 
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Conservative government intended to bestow significantly enhanced real volumes of 
spending upon (defence, law and order); those where they did not intend actual real 
cuts, but where they aimed to reduce the planned (and actual) rate of growth of 
expenditure (eg the National Health Service; social security); and, finally, some areas 
where they intended real (sometimes considerable) volume cuts (eg overseas aid; 
lending to the nationalised industries; support for private industry, the arts, and 
local authority housing). 
The record of what actually happened is shown in Table III. Government spending 
as a proportion of national income did not fall as originally planned. In fact,it rose 
into the greater-than-50 per cent range, peaking in 1982/83 at 53.79 per cent - a 
ratio higher than the “fiscal crisis” year of 1976 (which had driven the Labour 
government of that time “cap in hand” to the IMF)“. 
How was the first Thatcher government “blown off course”? A number of factors 
are cited by observers. First, those areas of spending which were planned to grow 
in any case (in real terms), turned out to require more expenditure than had been 
forecast; this was particularly the case with defence re-equipment in the early 1980s. 
Second, in those areas where the government planned to cut back on the growth in 
spending, they found that control was out of their hands, in the sense that they had 
badly underestimated client take-up of benefits and services (eg due to 
unemployment rising to over 3 million) or due to rising costs (eg the rising real cost 
of health care). In the third area, where real cuts were planned, the actual cuts 
often led to offsetting increases in public expenditure. For example, extra funds 
had to be provided to those nationalised industries undergoing “rationalisation”, to 
provide for redundancy compensation to large numbers of laid-off workers 16 . 
Whatever the causes - or excuses, as some might say - “if the Thatcher Government 
had ever hoped to cut total spending, that aim was soon abandoned” (Brittan, 1988, p. 
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246). By the mid-1980s, of the 14 main sectors of public expenditure categorised in 
the official (annual) Public Expenditure White Papers, only two had seen real cuts (ie 
“trade and industry”; and housing expenditures, due primarily to reduced local 
authority building programmes). 
By (at least) the Spring of 1984, a second phase of the Thatcherite approach to 
government spending during the 1980s had emerged, known as the “consolidation 
strategy”. This abandoned the target of the previous phase - to achieve a real 4 per 
cent cut in the volume of public expenditure over the period 1979/80 - 1983/84 - 
but retained the goal enunciated in The Right Approach to the Economy of reducing 
government spending as a proportion of GDP. This target, however, was now 
hopefully to be achieved by holding the volume of public expenditure roughly 
constant over the planning horizon of the 1984 White Paper on Public Expenditure 
(see the white columns in Figure I for 1984/85 to 1986/87) whilst making the 
(plausible) assumption of ongoing economic growth17. 
(FIGURE I NEAR HERE) 
The outcome, during this second phase in the mid-1980s, was a fall in government 
spending as a proportion of GDP, from 52.86 per cent in 1983 to 49.54 per cent in 
1986. Although this reversed the earlier rise in the ratio and brought it back close 
to the level of 1979, the actual volume of public expenditure in real terms had in 
each year considerably outstripped the totals that had been “planned” in 1984. 
Smith (1988, p 33) detects a third phase in this aspect of the Thatcher Decade, from 
1986-7 onwards, which he describes as “realism” in public expenditure planning. 
This was an underlying official assumption that whilst public spending would grow in 
real terms - holding it constant (the target of the second phase) proving too difficult 
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to achieve - that it might be held to less than the growth of GDP, so that the G/Y 
ratio would decline. 
This actually happened, as we see from the figures in Table III, the G/Y ratio 
declining to under 45 per cent by 1989. But the underlying “story” is more 
complicated than Smith diagnoses. In 1987 the Treasury planned for a falling 
volume of public expenditure in real terms for three years; but the planning total 
was significantly exceeded in the final year. 
The overall Thatcher record on government spending during the 1980s is thus both 
patchy and full of twists and turns - which were often conducted and announced 
somewhat sotto vote. What might we say about that record in general? 
First, despite the intentions clearly announced in The Right Approach to the 
Economy in 1977, the government presided over a rising ratio of government 
spending to GDP over the four-year period 1979-1982. Second, even its later 
“consolidation strategy” of holding total public spending constant in real terms was 
eventually abandoned in favour of a semi-fatalistic attitude of “realism” towards the 
growth of public spending. 
Fourth, nevertheless, it can be argued on the basis of figures that, by hook or by 
crook, the Thatcher government did eventually succeed in achieving some gradual 
year-by-year fall in the G/Y ratio. Taking 1982 as the peak (at 53.79 per cent), 
G/Y had been reduced to 44.5 per cent by 1989. 
Supporters of Mrs Thatcher would generally applaud this - admittedly belated - 
reduction in G/Y by 9.3 percentage points. Is this not, they say, a signal 
achievement? 
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The answer depends on which measuring rod we want to scale the success. On the 
one hand, the Thatcher governments of the mid-to-late 1980s have been more 
successful than governments in other countries in cutting the G/Y ratio: 
II 
. . . it was impressive in international terms: of the other six leading industrial 
economies, only Canada and West Germany have significantly reduced the 
public share below its all-time peak (during the 1980s). Only two of the big 
seven, the Americans and the Japanese, now spend less of their income 
publicly than the British. In 1980 the Canadians and Italians did too; in 
1970 so did the French and Germans” (Economist, 3 February 1990, p 29). 
Taking the average G/Y ratio over the years 1980-1988 and comparing them to 
1970-78 (see Table IV), however, reveals that the average ratio in the 1980s was 
higher (at 50.63 per cent) than the 1970s (at 48.62 per cent). 
In general, then, whilst the Thatcher government did eventually (after four years) get 
the great ball of government spending rolling in the direction it wanted, their 
average performance in this endeavour was not as stunning as international 
comparisons suggest, though admittedly the record is depressed by high 
unemployment in the 1980s. 
Moreover, as Figure I records, the projected totals for public expenditure in the early 
1990s show planned and significant growth. In short, this is a ball that is set to start 
rolling the other way. 
It is against this factual background that the decade-long debate about “cuts” in 
government spending in the UK needs to be judged. The newspaper headlines and 
editorials over the 1980s emphasised the announcement of, and provided sermons on, 
“cuts” in government spending. In the main, however, the successive Thatcher 
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governments avoided cuts in real government spending on a programmatic basis. 
Only one major programme saw genuine “slashing”: local government housing 
expenditure came down by 67 per cent between 1979-80 and 1989-90. 
The Thatcher governments of the 1980s mainly avoided significant cuts in major 
programmes - and indeed was already planning for considerable growth in the “big 
spender” areas of social security, health, and education in the early 199Os, even well 
before Mrs Thatcher’s departure from Office in November 1990. The avoidance of 
politically-painful and sizeable cuts in major programmes during the Thatcher 
decade, however, meant that government efforts were mainly directed at controlling, 
and eliminating, waste in those programmes: the basic existence of which was taken 
as sacrosanct. Whilst these efforts could be dismissed as largely marginal in total 
impact on the trajectory of government spending, we review them below in order to 
provide a rounded picture of developments during the 1980s. Moreover, the long- 
run significance of these developments may well be of greater measure than the 
headline-grabbing, yet largely mythical, “cuts” of the Thatcher Decade. 
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V DEVELOPMENTS IN THE MONITORING, CONTROL AND EVALUATION 
OF GOVERNMENT SPENDING IN THE UK 
The evolution of techniques of control, monitoring and appraisal for the public sector 
during the Thatcher decade may in fact be of more long-lasting significance than the 
attempt to “target” the ratios of enormous magnitudes, such as T/Y or G/Y. Such 
macroeconomic aggregates are inevitably difficult to control - whatever the political 
enthusiasm for so doing - in any finely-tuned way. The developments that we briefly 
review here, concern the underlying control and evaluation mechanisms in 
government spending. Advances of this sort, to the extent that they are successful in 
practice, offer the prospect of improving the efficiency and effectiveness of public 
spending if not changing its overall magnitude. 
Public spending is incremental and thus, unless checked, snowballs. This year’s 
spending is last year’s plus whatever new programmes ministers and their 
departments have managed to steer past the suspicious eyes of the Treasury. The idea 
of zero based budgeting, starting with a clean sheet of paper each year and thus 
requiring spenders to justify the whole of their spending, has made little or no 
progress in UK public finance. 
Although the Government failed in its main objective in 1979, to cut public 
spending, major strides have been made in improving value for money. These include 
new forms of financial and resource management, new attitudes in auditing and the 
spread of competitive tendering. Conservative governments also exploited the system 
of “cash limits” on spending introduced in April 1976 which replaced the setting of 
spending levels in volume terms. Stricter cash controls were experienced as the 
Government attempted to reign back spending, linking fiscal policy through the 
“public sector borrowing requirement” (PSBR) to its monetarist Medium Term 
Financial Strategy (MTFS). Consequently, real resource planning gave way to 
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financial control, and the Public Expenditure Survey Committee (PESC) planning 
system, dating back to the Plowden Report of 1961, became a principal means of 
controlling spending. 
.I Cash limits on the spending budgets of government ministries coupled with “externa 
financing limits” for the nationalised industries meant that pay awards and price ? 
increases during the year were no longer funded by the provision of additional 
monies. Either the volume of spending had to contract, which focussed attention on 
priorities within budget levels, or (where levied) charges to consumers had to be 
raised. At the same time the Government appeared to succeed in introducing a 
fundamental change in attitude within the public sector towards spending without 
which technical changes such as cash limits and efficiency audits would have 
foundered. 
One of the earliest initiatives was the appointment of Sir Derek (now Lord) Rayner, 
from the highly successful retailer Marks and Spencer, to a new Efficiency Unit of 
the Prime Minister’s Office. Here Sir Derek pioneered a high-profile set of studies 
into waste and inefficiency within government aimed at cutting costs. Alongside this 
early and ad.hoc. series of scrutinies, aimed at unearthing obvious (and sometimes 
bizarre) cases of government profligacy, from May 1982 the new Financial 
Management Initiative (FMI) provided a system of devolved budgeting for central 
government departments. It required each department to develop the management 
information systems (MINIS), first introduced with much success at the Department 
of the Environment in 1980, so as to clarify departmental objectives and outcomes. 
More generally, pushing cost or budget centres down the organisation gave 
management at all levels within government a clearer picture of what activities cost. 
Although government has remained hierarchically organised at a time when the 
private sector has sought efficiency gains through “flatter” management structures, 
there appears to be much greater accountability and cost control within government 
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today compared with a decade ago and this has been matched by more recent 
initiatives aimed at introducing similar forms of accountability into the NHS and 
education (eg. local management of schools). 
To underpin such organisational changes the Government has reformed public sector 
auditing. Previously, concerned with unearthing fraud and blatant waste, auditors are 
now also charged with assessing service effectiveness. As part of the reorganisation 
of auditing in favour of seeking out value for money, the National Audit Office was 
established in 1983 and a new Audit Commission was set up to monitor spending by 
local authorities. The latter has spearheaded the drive for better financial systems in 
local government and experimentation with competitive tendering. However, audit in 
government still tends to be an audit of systems rather than policies (Bovaird and 
Nutley, 1989, p.77). 
To assist audits and as a consequence of the FMI, a vast array of performance 
indicators has been developed within government to measure the economy of service 
delivery (the cost of inputs), the efficiency with which public services are provided 
(inputs related to outputs) and their effectiveness (achievement of goals). 
Performance indicators are not new. In 1980 a Treasury survey found widespread use 
of output measures in government departments to assist policy formulation and 
planning and to monitor achievement and efficient use of resources. But they were 
mainly used in day-to-day management rather than in wider strategic policy 
decisions relating to total public spending. 
In the 1980s performance measurement has mushroomed in all areas of the public 
sector so that the government boasts around 1800 output and performance measures 
in its public expenditure White Papers alone and department annual reports are 
peppered with references to performance. A NIESR report in 1985 concluded that 
“best practice” in performance measurement within government, “probably compares 
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favourably with much practice outside”. The productivity measurement systems for 
large clerical operations were found to be very similar to those in the private sector, 
but the private sector was found to have more investment in systems for cost and 
related analyses (H.M. Treasury, 1986, 1987). Financial incentives (other than 
promotion) for good performance exist (eg. in the HMSO) but remain 
underdeveloped compared with private firms and continue to sit uneasily alongside 
continued security of employment in government. 
The introduction of competitive tendering for government contracts is of a different 
order to the other initiatives. Traditionally, private sector firms have been invited to 
tender for government contracts, for example in defence and major construction 
projects, and since 1980, local authorities have also been required to put out to 
tender most building, highways and maintenance work. The 1988 Local Government 
Act, however, extended compulsory competitive tendering to a wide range of services 
(details in Table V) supplied previously in the main in-house by public sector 
employees or what are now usually referred to as “direct service organisations”. At 
the same time, competitive tendering in place of public monopoly provision has also 
been extended in central government departments and the National Health Service. 
(TABLE V NEAR HERE) 
Most recently, the Government has embarked upon a programme (“The Next Steps” 
initiative) which involves transferring work previously undertaken by government 
departments to quasi-independent agencies with their own managements 
(significantly, often headed by a “chief executive” rather than a “permanent 
secretary”) and their own budgets (HMSO, 1988). Already the Employment Service, 
the DVLC and the Land Registry, for example, have been placed under these 
agencies. By mid-1990, over 80,000 civil servants had been transferred to agencies 
and the Government had outline proposals to extend the scheme to a further 200,000; 
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thereby reducing the core or traditionally structured civil service by almost 50 per 
cent. The objective of this reform, like enforcing competitive tendering for contracts, 
is to achieve better value for money (Kemp, 1990). A review of the evidence 
suggests that competitive tendering reduces costs by the order of 20 per cent or more 
and usually without a noticeable fall in service effectiveness (Parker, 1990). 
New monitoring and appraisal methods alongside compulsory competitive tendering 
and the injection of new, more commercially orientated management has led some 
commentators to judge that there has been a fundamental shift in attitudes within 
government. “Over the past ten years a cultural change has taken place in Whitehall 
and in the town halls of local authorities. Civil servants are now regarded as resource 
managers rather than administrators.” (Brown and Jackson, 1990, p.207). Such 
commentators can point to the increased use of performance related pay schemes in 
place of the incremental salary scale (automatic annual pay rises rarely linked to true 
performance) and fixed-term employment contracts replacing the life-time 
employment traditionally associated with public sector jobs. 
Nonetheless, and while not wishing to minimise the extent and significance of the 
changes which have occurred, it would be wrong to exaggerate them, Much remains 
to be done. For example, performance related pay has been introduced tentatively 
and mainly on an experimental basis. It mostly affects professional jobs (the top 
ranks of government) rather than technical and manual staffs. The same comments 
apply to the adoption of fixed-term employment contracts. Also, it would be 
surprising in an organisation as vast as government if waste or “x-inefficiency” did 
not continue to exist and the risk exists that where inefficiency was rooted out in the 
198Os, without continued vigilance it will return. To what extent there has been a 
major cultural change in those large areas of government still isolated from market 
forces remains especially questionable. 
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There has also been little change in the principles by which spending decisions and 
tax receipts are matched (or not, as the case may be). Despite numerous papers by 
academics in the last ten years pointing out the advantages to the public finances of 
relating public expenditure plans more closely to the means of financing them (so 
that spending decisions take more cognisance of available tax revenues), there is still 
no structure by which this must happen. Under Conservative governments in the 
198Os, public spending was held back to allow for tax “cuts”, but this was dependent 
upon political will at the highest level. Mrs. Thatcher took a particular interest in 
government spending remaining tightly controlled. There can be no guarantee that 
policy will not now revert in favour of deficit financing, especially in the face of an 
economic recession. Public monitoring of spending and taxing decisions would be 
enhanced by the simple administrative procedure of announcing them on the same 
day. Public spending plans continue to be set-out in the Autumn Financial Statement 
in November and taxes in the Budget the following March. This method reflects a 
state of mind, dominant in the Keynesian era, that spending and taxing are best 
assessed separately with excess spending financed through borrowing. 
The central problem facing management of the public finances remains the same now 
as when Adam Smith launched his fundamental critique of the state two centuries 
ago - how to get value for money. Although government is more accountable, more 
performance orientated and for all we know better managed today compared with 
1979, in the absence of market prices it is difficult (impossible?) to judge the 
efficiency and effectiveness of Government. To take a couple of obvious examples, 
how can we know whether the school teacher or surgeon, let alone the Foreign 
Office diplomat, is value for money when the output is intangible and maybe even 
incorrigible? How can we relate inputs to outputs when the outputs cannot be 
measured or even, sometimes, defined or agreed. Despite the Government’s belief in 
the market economy and privatisation, the introduction of charges for government 
services has lagged well behind the development of “efficiency audits” and the 
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appointment of the officials to man them. Where “price signals” or their proxies have 
been introduced, eg. in bidding for higher education resources, implementation has 
been slow and faltering in the face of determined opposition from public sector 
managers and their employees. 
2L 
VI THE COMMUNITY CHARGE 
Although the Conservative Governments of the 1980s failed to trim both the volume 
of public spending and the tax to GDP ratio as planned, it was one specific fiscal 
measure rather than the Government’s programme as a whole which led to Mrs 
Thatcher’s fall in November 1990 - the introduction of the Community Charge (more 
popularly known as the “Poll Tax”). 
Historically, local government in the UK has been financed by a combination of 
domestic and business rates, central government grants and (to a much lesser extent) 
through charges for services. 18 Restrictions on central government grants alongside 
the government’s failure to curb local government expenditure meant substantial rate 
increases in the 1980s of which a large proportion fell on local businesses. Of rate 
revenues, on average 60 per cent came from commercial ratepayers and the 
remainder from the domestic sector. 
The rating system had been criticised for many years; the problem, however, was 
always one of finding a more acceptable local tax to replace it. There was a general 
perception that rates were unfair. Attention was drawn to the widow paying the 
same rates as the household next door with three breadwinners. In so far as larger 
properties tended to have high rateable values and those on high incomes or large 
wealth tended to live in bigger houses than the poor, there was in fact a crude 
correlation between rates paid and ability to pay (although there were undoubtedly 
cases of hardship, despite “relief” for those on low incomes). More authoritatively, 
the Layfield Committee inquiry into local finance which reported in 1976, concluded 
that rates were broadly progressive in incidence for those on low incomes, 
proportionate over the middle range and regressive at high incomes. Rates paid also 
did not reflect benefits received from local expenditures. Despite much political 
rhetoric, the Thatcher governments did little to transfer the burden of financing local 
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services from taxation to prices, so that marginal benefits received by local 
households could be equated with the marginal costs of supplying services to them 
(Banham, 1986). 
To make matters worse, there was a divorce between the local franchise and the 
financing of local services, ie there was “representation without taxation”. To lessen 
the regressive nature of rates, around 17 per cent of households, but a much higher 
percentage in inner-city areas, did not pay domestic rates in full. This meant that 
high spending (Labour) councils ran a smaller risk of being ejected by their 
electorate. 
In 1986 the government announced the replacement of domestic rates with a 
Community Charge and the establishment of a Uniform Business Rate (UBR). The 
Community Charge - a flat rate tax paid by most adults in full and by those on low 
incomes at 20 per cent of the flat rate level replaced domestic rates in Scotland on 1 
April 1989 and in England and Wales on 1 April 1990. Given its almost universal 
incidence, it widened the tax base compared with rates 
No other developed country uses or has seriously considered using a Poll Tax to 
finance local government, not least because of its perceived unfairness and rarely in 
the history of taxation has a tax whipped up so much emotion and political 
opposition. The name. the Community Charge was intended to conjure up the idea of 
a payment for services consumed. Also, like any lump sum tax, it avoids the 
problem of “excess burden”. But the relationship between benefits received (services 
consumed) and amounts paid remains crude. The Community Charge is not a 
charge in the true sense, it does not reflect a market price, it remains a tax. 
Moreover, a tax based on the principle of (almost) everyone paying the same amount 
is clearly going to be inequitable on ability to pay grounds. Indeed, as the details in 
Figure 2 demonstrate, the Community Charge is more regressive than the old rating 
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system even though 6 million people on low incomes pay only 20 per cent of the full 
charge. 
(FIGURE 2 NEAR HERE) 
Critics of the Community Charge have focussed on its perceived “unfairness”; though 
most economists would remind us that it is the overall tax system ,rather than 
individual taxes that should be assessed in terms of equity (eg Kay and King, 1990). 
Perhaps more worrying therefore, especially given the Government’s commitment to 
“cut taxes” is the fact that: “In relation to household income there are at least three 
times as many households paying more in local taxes in real terms in 1990/91 
compared with 1989/90 than households paying less” (Ridge and Smith, 1990, p 49). 
The growth in the local tax burden - completely contrary to the intention when the 
Government proposed the Community Charge - is associated with a sharp rise in 
local authority spending. In estimating the average level of the Charge in England 
and Wales for 1990/91, the government anticipated that councils would spend f32.8 
bn. In fact spending rose to f36 bn and given that the Charge typically raises only 
around 15 per cent of a local authority’s total revenue, to fund the spending 
overshoot, local tax bills exceeded the government’s target figure (an average charge 
of f256) by 35 per cent. Matters were made much worse for some local authorities 
by a complex “safety net” scheme intended to lessen the impact of the new tax on 
those areas which would lose out. The scheme involve redistributing money from 
councils that would gain from the new tax to those that would lose. A more 
detailed estimate of the effects of the introduction of the Community Charge for 
different local authorities is provided in Table VI. 
(TABLE VI NEAR HERE) 
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The new tax has also added to local bureaucracy; on average local authority 
departments handling the tax have doubled their staffing levels. Therefore, it is at 
least twice as expensive to collect the Charge compared with the domestic rates. 
Also, because it is a tax on (mobile) people, whereas rates were levied on (fixed) 
property, the scope for evasion is that much greater. Hence, a Government 
committed to enhancing “individual freedom” has had to impose compulsory 
registration for the tax. Also, the level of non-payment of the Community Charge 
has far exceeded non-payment of rates, leading to a shortfall in receipts which in 
turn has triggered higher than expected levels of local authority borrowing. Kay 
and King concluded, after reviewing the introduction of the new tax: “The 
administrative problems of making this system work seem to lie somewhere between 
the formidable and the overwhelming” (Kay and King, 1990, p 138). In so far as 
economy in administration is desirable for any tax, and should be desired by a 
government keen to reduce the size of public bureaucracies, the Community Charge 
fails the test. 
Businesses too, while initially welcoming a nationally set business rate, thus removing 
the pernicious effect of control by high spending councils, are now having second 
thoughts. The UBR is an earmarked national tax which is pooled and then 
distributed by central government to local authorities on a formula basis as a per 
capita grant (it is not, therefore, a local tax). Initially it was set so as to raise the 
same amount of revenue from businesses as commercial rates under the old system 
and the intention is that each year it will rise by the national inflation rate. By this 
formula the government intended keeping the real rates burden on businesses 
constant. However, this has not prevented major rate rises for many firms. The 
reason lies in the “uniform” nature of the tax, which has led to a redistribution of the 
rate burden amongst businesses. Overall, and despite a five year phasing in period, 
the Inland Revenue has estimated that around 500,000 English businesses will 
experience rate rises in each of the next two years of 20% in real terms. Of these, 
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200,000 are likely to see their rates increase in real terms for a further three years. 
Translated into national trends, as a broad generalisation industry and businesses in 
the north of England and Wales, under (ironically) predominantly Labour controlled 
councils will gain, while those in retailing and the south, mainly under Conservative 
authorities, will pay more. The effects of the uniform business rate on the 
distribution of the local tax burden are summarised in Table VII. 
(TABLE VII NEAR HERE) 
The Community Charge singularly failed to make many friends outside the 
government and there were reports of splits within the government especially over 
the way its introduction was managed. Ironically, Mrs Thatcher, who did much to 
pioneer tax reduction and reform, fell foul of this one botched reform. Political 
opposition to the Community Charge inside and outside the Conservative Party was 
instrumental in undermining her position as Prime Minister. There was no surprise 
when her successor, John Major, shortly after taking office announced that the new 
tax was to be replaced. 
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VII CONCLUSIONS 
The single biggest failure in the reform of UK public finance in the 1980s was 
undoubtedly the introduction of the Community Charge. Whether on balance the 
introduction of the Charge was sound in principle but badly executed is a matter for 
continuing debate. The government should not, however, have been surprised by the 
political costs which resulted from its introduction. No-one likes a “new” tax and 
people quickly forget the inequities of the old one it replaces. Moreover, chaos and 
ill-feeling have accompanied previous attempts in Britain to raise revenue through 
Poll ,Taxes. In 1380 the attempt led to the disastrous Peasants Revolt; while in 1641 
a further try produced fiscal chaos, popular discontent and, at the end of the day, 
very little extra revenue. 
Away from the Poll Tax, the main thrust of government policy has been towards 
controlling costs and increasing accountability within government for decisions taken. 
This offers, over the longer-term, the prospect of a more efficient and effective 
public sector with (possibly) savings for taxpayers. But to date there has been little 
progress in introducing the most obvious test of value for money - the willingness of 
consumers to pay for the service. 
Progress in “rolling back the state” in terms of cutting public spending has also been 
limited. Few areas of government spending have been cut in real terms and “success” 
must be gauged in terms of restraining the rate of increase in total government 
spending, so as to reduce its share of GDP, alongside a major programme of 
privatisation of state industry and the introduction of more competitive tendering for 
public sector contracts. 
Each year has seen a voluminous and formidably complex set of new tax legislation, 
which has introduced numerous “tax breaks” to encourage saving and investment 
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@ES, PETS, TESSA, etc) while closing off others (eg relief for life assurance 
premiums). But apart from Lawson’s reforming budget of 1984, which reduced 
Corporation Tax rates in return for much less generous capital allowances for 
business investment, there has been no systematic attempt to simplify the overly- 
complex tax system; a system which remains an enigma to the vast bulk of taxpayers 
and which continues to distort economic activity. Moreover, the government has 
singularly failed to reduce the overall burden of taxation in the economy. Those on 
the highest rates of tax gained as the top marginal rate of tax fell from 93 per cent 
to 40 per cent. But the reduction has been much more modest for the vast majority 
who pay only the basic rate (down from 33 per cent to 25 per cent), which moreover 
has been at least in part offset by higher NIC contributions and an almost doubling 
of the VAT rate on goods and services. Expressed as a percentage of GDP, the tax 
“burden” by the end of the 1980s was higher than when the government took office a 
decade earlier and (less well known) higher than in any year of the 197Os, with the 
exception of 1970. 
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FOOTNOTES 
1. Mrs Thatcher first became Prime Minister after the general election of May, 
1979. She and her Conservative Party were re-confirmed in government, 
with very substantial majorities, in the general elections of 1983 and 1987. 
She resigned from Office in November, 1990. 
2. Even though Mrs Thatcher was to declare in late 1989 that there was much 
on her “unfinished agenda”, and that she would seek a fourth term of Office. 
3. Assuming that the economy is not on that portion of the Laffer Curve 
whereby the depressive effect of a cut in tax rates on total tax revenues is 
more than offset by the increase in those revenues resulting from the induced 
buoyancy of economic activity. 
4. The PSBR is a “uniquely British” statistic; as a measure of the budget deficit 
it is wider than the indicators deployed in most Western comparator nations. 
The PSBR is a measure of the gross amount of new borrowing that the 
government has to undertake in money terms over a period of time in order 
to cover the difference between its total expenditure and its total receipts. 
5. The target PSBR surplus for 1990-91 was f7 billion, but due to the slow 
down in the economy it was not achieved. The outcome was a f 1 billion 
deficit. A deficit of f8 billion is now projected for 1991-92. The PSBR is 
- even at the best of times - a fairly “erratic” statistic. 
6. See Burton (1985). chapters I and II for a survey of these hypotheses. 
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7. British national income accounting, as elsewhere, is not an exact science. 
There are, in particular, considerable residual errors between the expenditure- 
based and income-based measures of UK GDP, the sign of which changed 
over the 1980s. Until the early 1980s. the expenditure estimate of GDP was 
typically larger than the income-based statistic: a difference which some took 
as a measure of the size of the black economy. In the 198Os, however, the 
income estimate moved ahead of the expenditure estimate of UK, GDP. It is 
“most unlikely” that the UK black economy disappeared into a black hole 
during the Thatcher decade! 
8. The figures quoted in the text of this Treasury document differ from the 
figures shown in our Table I due to changes in the definition of government 
spending. Such was the “public spending crisis” in the UK in the mid-1970s 
that the radically smaller definition (“general government”) was adopted for 
1977, and this achieved an immediate, and large, apparent drop in British 
government spending (Treasury, 1977). There have been other, smaller 
changes in the definition of public expenditure in the UK since (as in 1982). 
The figures given in Table I are the most consistent and up-to-date of those 
available. 
9. Defined in terms of domestic credit expansion (DCE). 
10. Lord Hailsham (1978) has consequently labelled the present British 
constitutional system as one of “elective dictatorship”. 
11. We note in passing that the UK national accounts - as with other national 
accounting systems - ignore the source of real revenue to government arising 
from the inflation tax. In 1990, with the UK once again experiencing a 




One notable tax change before this budget involved the replacement in 1986 
of Capital Transfer Tax (introduced in 1975 as part of the Labour 
Government’s attack on the wealthy) with an Inheritance Tax. The effect of 
this was to remove taxation on gifts of most assets inter vivos with the main 
exception of those occurring within 7 years of death. The threshold at which 
the tax becomes payable was also increased and the graduated banding greatly 
simplified. Overall the result has been a significant reduction in the incidence 
of capital taxation on gifts and estates. 
Amongst other things, the then Chancellor also announced that the present 
system for taxing the incomes of married couples - and which had been in 
existence for 180 years - would be abolished as of April 1990. Prior to that 
date, a married woman had no independent status as a taxpayer, her income 
being aggregated with the husband’s. They are now taxed independently of 
each other; but “... the most significant fact about the reform is that for 
almost everyone there will be no practical effect” (Dilnot and Kay, 1990, p. 
164). 
14. Also, in 1979 there were no fewer than 11 income-tax bands. The two-band 
structure, post March 1988, is thus a considerable simplification of the 
system. 
15. A “fiscal crisis” was averted in the early 1980s by reduced resort to deficit 
finance (cf the mid-1970s), and the containment of the PSBR by a 
combination of rising tax revenues and a then-small, but growing, reliance 
upon privatisation proceeds (under current UK national accounting 
conventions, privatisation receipts are counted as “negative public spending”, 
and thus directly reduce the PSBR, ceteris paribw). Independent calculations 
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suggest that over the period 1978/79 to 1983/84, UK public expenditure rose 
by nearly 8 per cent in volume terms - compared to the planned fall of 4 per 
cent on that basis (Ellis, 1985). 
16. The nationalised industries were also hit by the recession of the early 198Os, 
leading to additional redundancies to those which would otherwise have 
occurred. 
17. The figures for public expenditure given in Figure I do not conform to those 
we utilise in Tables I, II and III for two main reasons: first, we utilise cash, 
not real (inflation-adjusted) figures to record the actual growth of 
government spending; and second, our figures refer to general government 
expenditure and not to the “planning total for public expenditure” (a narrower 
UK measure of government spending). 
18. Rates were a tax on property, both domestic and commercial. Each local 
authority would calculate its expected expenditure for the financial year and, 
after deducting the amount to be received in grants and from charges, the 
remaining expenditure was met from the local rate. The amount paid by 
each household and business was based on the rateable value of their 
properties. Rateable values were supposed to represent the amount which a 
property might reasonably expect to earn if let from year to year on a 
tenant’s repairing lease. In practice, however, a combination of high 
inflation and infrequent revaluations (the last in England and Wales occurred 
in 1973) meant that the rateable value bore no resemblance to the amount that 
could be received in rents. 
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TABLE I THE 1970s UK FISCAL RECORD 
Year Y T G T/Y G/Y PSBR 
E million 2 million f million % % E million 
1970 44,209 19,090 20,897 43.18 47.27 -51 
1971 50,366 20,163 23,494 40.03 46.65 1,320 
1972 56,316 21,413 26,409 38.02 46.89 1,950 
1973 65,805 24,055 30,496 36.55 46.34 4,093 
1974 76,412 29,968 39,165 39.22 51.26 5,451 
1975 96,718 38,439 51,470 39.74 53.22 10,161 
1976 115,070 44,487 58,496 38.66 50.84 8,899 
1977 130,672 50,639 61,790 38.75 47.29 5,419 
1978 150,639 56,289 72,105 37.37 47.87 8,340 
1979 173,484 67,414 84,342 38.86 49.19 12,551 
Notes: All annual data are for the fiscal year in UK 1 April to 31 March 
Y = Gross Domestic Product at factor cost (current prices) 
T = General government Receipts, from tax, national insurance 
‘contributions’, etc. 
G = General Government total Expenditure. 
PSBR = Public Sector Borrowing Requirement. 
Source: Datastream 








Capital Gains Tax 
Value Added Tax 



















1. 83% on “earned income” ie. wages and salaries. 
2. 
3. 
Now taxed at the individual’s income tax marginal rate. 
See footnote 12 for a brief explanation. 
TABLE III THE 1980s UK FISCAL RECORD 
Year Y T G T/Y G/Y PSBR 
f million E million f million % % ): million 
1980 201,870 82,549 104,060 40.89 51.55 11,786 
1981 220,348 96,053 116,813 43.59 53.01 10,507 
1982 239,002 106,434 128,557 44.53 53.79 4,868 
1983 ‘,,2,335 .^ 115,290 138,680 43.94 52.86 11,574 
1984 279,887 123,377 146,752 44.08 52.43 10,300 
1985 306,975 134,765 156,815 43.90 51.08 7,445 
1986 326,873 143,954 161,936 44.04 49.54 2,499 
1987 358,832 156,439 168,360 43.60 46.92 -1,434 
1988 399,0: 5 173,908 177,042 43.58 44.36 - .11,595 
1989 437,854 187,851 194,825 42.90 44.50 -9.130 
Notes: See Notes to Table I 
Source: Datastream 
TABLE IV THE UK TAX AND GOVERNMENT SPENDING “BURDENS” 
THE 1970s AND 1980s COMPARED 
Time Span 
T/Y G/Y 
% Annual Average % Annual Average 
1970-1978 39.06 48.62 
1980-1988 43.57 50.63 
TABLE V SERVICES SUBJECT TO COMPULSORY COMPETITIVE 
TENDERING UNDER THE 1988 LOCAL GOVERNMENT 
ACT 
Service Description 
Refuse collection Household and commercial waste 
Building cleaning Excludes cleaning of dwellings, old people’s 
homes, children’s homes and police buildings. 
Other cleaning Covers street cleansing - including gully emptying; 
removal of litter from any land, not just streets; 
emptying litter bins; and the cleaning of traffic signs 
and street name plates. 
Catering Covers all catering activities except school and welfare 
catering and catering at institutions of further and 
higher education. Also, specifically excludes the 
delivery of “meals on wheels” and the preparation of 
meals and refreshments in special and residential 
establishments and day centres provided that the meals 
and refreshments are prepared on the premises. 
Maintenance of ground Including plant nursery work but excluding work 
primarily in the nature of research or plant survival. 
Repair and maintenance 
of vehicles 
Excludes repair of accident damage and the 
repair and maintenance of police vehicles and fire 
service vehicles. 
Sport and leisure 
management 
Note: Sport and leisure management was added to the list of defined activities 
under the 1988 Act by Order of 1 July 1988. Competition for this activity 
will be phased in after the main programme is completed, ie. not before 1 
January 1992. The Act empowers the Secretary of State to add further 
activities, subject to Parliamentary approval. 
Source: Department of the Environment (1988) 








All authorities 345 256 35 248 
Conservative 338 260 30 118 
Labour 358 256 40 70 
SLD 363 269 35 23 
Independent/other 301 218 38 37 
Inner London 290 240 21 7 
Outer London 338 286 18 11 
Metropolitan Areas 374 273 37 18 
English Shires 355 259 37 180 
Wales 233 172 35 32 
Source: Phillip Ramsdale, IPF Ltd, for the BBC Today Programme 
TABLE VII CHANGES IN BUSINESS RATES IN ENGLAND 










Rest of south-east 
-47 -40 -15 
-47 -44 -16 
-49 -50 -IS 
-38 -36 -5 
-35 -24 -3 
-12 -7 +29 
-16 -10 +32 
+5 +13 +72 
-20 -15 +24 











Source: Financial Times, 4 January, 1990. 
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Figure 2. Net Local Tax as a Percentage of income 
0’ I 
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Source: Ridge and Smith, 1990, ~40. 
